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The system of representation in a democracy stands on two cornerstones. The first, of course, is 
that elected representatives respond to public opinion by creating policy that reflects the public’s 
preferences. This first cornerstone reflects majoritarian theories of representation. However, 
democratic theory scholars have long recognized that the mass public is uninformed about, and 
uninterested in, many issues. Thus, the second cornerstone of democratic representation is 
rooted in the pluralist school – policy is the result of conflictual participation between active and 
interested groups, with policy makers hearing competing arguments and making policy based on 
the more compelling claims (e.g. Dahl 2005).
1
 
 Pluralism typically invokes interest groups and lobbying, but the ―outside government‖ 
game is vitally important as well, as scholars have long claimed (e.g., McAdam and Su 2002; 
Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule and King 2006). American history is wrought with examples of 
seemingly voiceless groups organizing mass protests as the only avenue to deliver them the say-
so they desired. Indeed, this option is sometimes held up as the great equalizer – if the voiceless 
and powerless can organize themselves, they can force the nation to take notice.  This raises the 
question of whether or not an important part of this second cornerstone of democratic theory 
holds true. That is, to what degree do social movements influence public opinion and policy?  
And, in turn, to what degree are they affected by public opinion and policy?  
 Over the past decade, social movement scholars have moved from complaining about the 
lack of scholarship on the effects of social movements on policy (e.g., Giugni 1998), to 
uncovering the messy reality that the effects of social movements on policy are contingent on 
elements of the political opportunity structure (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Amenta, 
                                                 
1
 For example, Robert Dahl (1956) confronts the problem of how the intensity of preferences 
should be represented in government. He finds no formal, ―constitutional‖ solution, instead 
turning to ―extra-constitutional‖ solutions that involve those with intense preferences performing 
political activities – which would seemingly include political protests.  
2 
 
Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Amenta and Young 1999; Cress and Snow 2000; Burstein and 
Linton 2002; Soule and Olzak 2004). As well, we now know that the effects of movements 
depend on the stage of the policymaking process (King, Cornwall and Dahlin 2005; King, 
Bentele, and Soule 2007; Soule and King 2008), and the level of counter-movement activity 
(Soule 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004). Moreover, scholars have begun to note the dynamic and 
recursive nature of this relationship, arguing that social movements impact public opinion and 
policy and are also impacted by these (Soule et al. 1999; McAdam and Su 2002; Olzak and 
Soule 2009).   
 In addition to questions of how protest matters to policy-making, social movement 
theorists have also devoted much time and energy to the question of what explains the 
emergence of (and fluctuation in) levels of protest (e.g., Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su 
1999; Snow, Cress, and Soule 2005; Snow and Soule 2010). In fact, nearly 40 years ago, Wilson 
(1973: 33) noted:  "Without doubt, the question most frequently asked about social movements 
is: Under which typical social conditions do social movements normally arise?‖  Nearly 25 years 
later, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996: 7) asserted that ―Understanding the mix of factors 
that give rise to a movement is the oldest, and arguably the most important, question in the 
field.‖ Scholarship on this question has indicated the importance of some basic level of 
movement resources and mobilizing structures, the importance of a facilitative political 
opportunity structure, and the importance of mobilizing grievances (see review in Snow and 
Soule 2010).  
 While we have certainly learned a lot about the linkages between fluctuations in social 
protest, policymaking, and public opinion, almost all of the research on both the emergence of 
protest and its effects on policy focuses on a single movement at a time, in a single period of 
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time (for an exception, see King, Bentele, and Soule 2007).  Inspired by the concept of the 
protest cycle or protest wave (Tarrow 1994), in this paper we examine the entirety of social 
protest, in the United States, over a 35-year period. Our goal is to understand whether the 
waxing and waning of liberal social protest, writ large, is connected in any way to public 
opinion and policymaking.
2
  We assume that groups are linked by common causes and roots, 
rising and falling together across time, and we test how well this assumption allows us to explain 
systematic variance in liberal protest movements and in public opinion. We find a powerful role 
for liberal social movements in affecting public opinion, indicating support for the second 
cornerstone of democratic theory. 
 How might protests rise and fall together across time, affecting public opinion?  For an 
answer, the macro politics model of American politics is a useful place to start. This literature 
deals with national politics at the system level. In this literature public opinion is conceptualized 
and measured at a highly aggregated level (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002, Stimson, 
MacKuen and Erikson 1995, Stimson 1999) and focuses on how macro opinion influences and 
responds to other aspects of the American political system – partisanship, election outcomes, 
policy production, economic conditions, and so on (Durr 1993, Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 
2002, Kelly 2009, Kelly and Enns n.d., Page and Shapiro 1992, Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 
1995, Wlezien 1995). Collectively, this literature shows that public opinion both influences and 
is responsive to shifts in other aspects of the political system. Liberal shifts in public opinion 
generate Democratic electoral victories, liberal policy outputs, and less income inequality. But 
public opinion also responds over time to the dynamics of the political system. The public 
becomes more conservative as policies become more liberal than they prefer, acting as the 
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 We consider only liberal protest events here, and not conservative as well, because we find 
(thus far) only random variance in conservative protest. We explain further in the conclusion. 
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thermostat in the system of macro politics (Wlezien 1995). But social movements have not been 
integrated with studies of the American macro polity. 
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE MODEL OF PROTEST 
 We take the existing theory on why social movements arise as our starting point, and 
argue that policy mood matters for the emergence of, and fluctuation in, social protest. We test 
two possible models by which policy mood and liberal protests may matter for one another. The 
first model – the Political Opportunity Structure model of protest – argues that the changing 
nature of policy mood presents social movement organizers with political opportunities 
(McAdam 1996; Burstein and Linton 2001; Soule and Olzak 2004).  
The concept of the POS is one element of the broader political process model (McAdam 
1982), which has been used widely to explain the emergence of social movement activity. While 
it has been defined in various ways by various authors, we follow Tarrow’s definition of the POS 
as the "consistent... dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure‖ (Tarrow 1994: 
85). Scholars working within the POS framework note that activists are attentive to variations in 
the openness of the political environment to their protests, and that activists respond to these 
variations in the environment by either protesting or not (Snow and Soule 2010).  
The POS has been invoked to explain mobilization of social movements as diverse as the 
women’s movement (Soule et al. 1999; Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule and King 2006), the 
environmental movement (Olzak and Soule 2009), student movements (Van Dyke 2004), and 
militia organizing (Van Dyke and Soule 2002). However, it is somewhat striking that those 
studies using quantitative methodology have revealed somewhat mixed support for the core 
hypotheses from the POS tradition. Despite the fact that empirical work on the POS has been 
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rather mixed, we still feel it is important to consider the effect of the POS on liberal protest 
activity. We wish to explore the notion that perhaps the whole (meaning, the impact of all of 
these protest movements) is greater than the sum of the parts (the impact of each movement 
considered in isolation). 
 Dynamic policy mood may present social movement organizers with changing 
opportunities; when policy mood is liberal, liberal social movements have a greater opportunity 
to be successful because the issues they care about are capable of receiving more support from 
the American people (Soule and Olzak 2004). This will, in turn, lead to greater policy success. 
 However, as Soule and Olzak (2004) imply, the activism of these rising social 
movements can lead to an ideological backlash, which in turn moves public mood in the 
opposite ideological direction. Scholars find that policy mood swings across time in liberal and 
conservative directions because eventually policy becomes ―too‖ liberal or conservative, and 
public opinion moves in the other direction to bring the system to some balance (Stimson, 
MacKuen and Erikson 1995, Wlezien 1995). Given this first model, we hypothesize that the 
electorate is responding not just to the ideological tenor of policy, but to the activities of 
ideological social movements as well. Public opinion moves in the opposite direction, in part, 
because of the social movements, and in response to them. 
 The causal argument of this first perspective, then, has two components. As policy mood 
trends in a liberal direction, liberal social movements should become more active. Second, rising 
liberal social movements should produce public opinion movement in the opposite ideological 
direction, in an attempt to find a place of ideological equilibrium within the system. Stated 
explicitly, the first perspective leads to the following two hypotheses: 
H1:  Greater liberal policy mood leads to greater liberal protests. 
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H2:  Greater liberal protests feedback and reduce liberal policy mood.  
THE PROTEST AS COUNTER-CYCLE MODEL 
 The second model of the relationship between policy mood and liberal social movements 
leads to dramatically different expectations. What we label the protest as counter-cycle model 
suggests that liberal mood reduces the prevalence of liberal social movement activity and that 
liberal social movement activity generates liberal shifts in public opinion – precisely the opposite 
prediction of the POS model discussed in the previous section. This model begins with a 
different perspective on why social movements arise. Instead of social movements gaining 
traction when the political opportunity structure is favorable, this model presumes that social 
movements are generated by frustration with the status quo. A conservative political 
environment generates liberal disaffection with the status quo, which generates an organized 
reaction by liberal protestors. If this is the case, we would expect to see liberal protest activity 
rise when the political environment is more conservative. With regard to the impact of public 
opinion on social movements, then, this model suggests that liberal social movements gain 
momentum when public opinion is conservative. 
For the countercyclical model of protest to make complete sense, protest activity must 
also have certain effects on the political system, including public opinion. Specifically, if protest 
arises to counter an unfavorable political environment, ideally this protest activity would help to 
make the political environment more favorable. This suggests a positive link between liberal 
protest activity and liberal public opinion. 
John Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Acceptance-Sample (RAS) theory of public opinion 
suggests a mechanism through which liberal protests might generate liberal opinion. Zaller 
argues that when people answer survey questions (and such responses do form the measure of 
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policy mood), they sample from relevant considerations. These relevant considerations come 
from messages that they have accepted in the past (beliefs they have chosen to endorse). These 
considerations were communicated to them, in some manner, by their environment. When they 
perceived the message, they ―received‖ it, according to the model. 
Beginning with the first stage of the RAS model, we expect rising liberal social 
movements to increase the number of liberal messages people are exposed to. We see this as a 
one-way information flow. As liberal social movements rise, people should receive more pro-
liberal messages from all of the possible sources for such messages:  the media, but also interest 
groups, campaigns, or other sources as well.
3
  Importantly, the most widespread and active 
movements may create their own message sources. For example, one common source has been 
churches:  black churches play an important role in politicizing blacks (Calhoun-Brown 1996, 
Tate 1991), as well as evangelical whites (especially about abortion; e.g. Jelen and Wilcox 
2003). 
 Turning to the acceptance stage of the RAS model, more pro-liberal messages will move 
public opinion through both priming and framing. Liberal protest movements will communicate 
more liberal considerations as they become more active. This will prime these considerations, 
which should make them more accessible to people in the third stage of the survey response 
(sampling). In addition, the frames of the liberal protest movements should be dominant, which 
may persuade some to hold opinions that are more liberal (e.g. Nelson and Oxley 1999). 
 For the third stage of the survey response, the increase in liberal considerations will lead 
people to sample from these increased considerations, increasing the probability of delivering a 
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 Reporters follow the ―norm of objectivity‖ by reporting both sides of an issue (Schiffer 2008). 
However, the media also reflect an unequal reality in which one message flow dominates 
another. 
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liberal response to an interviewer. The crux of the argument, of course, is that people will have 
increasing liberal opinions, which will reflect their information environments. 
H3:  Greater liberal protest leads to greater liberal policy mood. 
H4:  Greater liberal policy mood leads to reduced policy mood. 
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR LIBERAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
As discussed above, one theory that links social movements and policy mood sees public 
opinion as part of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS). POS scholars argue that political 
protest movements arise because aspects of the political environment allow them greater chances 
to be successful. Policy mood is only one part of that environment, though it is the aspect to 
which we are most attentive in this paper. In his synthesis of a number of scholarly treatments of 
this issue, McAdam (1996: 26-29) identified a ―highly consensual list of (four) dimensions of 
political opportunity:‖ (1) system accessibility or the degree to which a political system is open 
or closed to challenge; (2) the relative stability of the pattern of political alignments within a 
system; (3) the presence or absence of influential allies; and (4) the repressive capacity of the 
state or relevant political entity. Other aspects of the POS beyond public opinion may provide 
similar incentives for liberal protest movement leaders – such as electing a Democratic president, 
or electing more Democrats to Congress. So we also pay attention to multiple other aspects of 
the POS in our effort to explain liberal protests – partisan control of the presidency, House, and 
Senate; divided government, the ideological tenor of public policy, and government repression. 
We discuss the expected impact of each of these factors below. 
 Scholars have also identified two other leading accounts for the emergence of protest: 
strain theory and resource mobilization theory. The basic postulate of strain theory is that dire 
social conditions (e.g., widespread poverty and unemployment) and/or rapidly changing 
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conditions (e.g., dramatic changes in population) have disruptive effects that can lead individuals 
who are affected by them to participate in social movement activity. Hence, the origins and 
emergence of protest are rooted in these underlying social conditions that impact some people 
more directly than others, thus making them somehow more susceptible to movement activity. 
There are at least four different variants of strain theory. One is the mass society variant, 
which argues that it is the disintegration of social ties and general sense of anomie that leads 
people to join social movements (Kornhauser 1959). A second is the absolute deprivation 
variant, which instead focuses on poor life conditions, such as extreme poverty, which push 
people into social movement activity in an attempt to alleviate whatever dire social condition 
they are experiencing (Marx and Engels 1948; Piven and Cloward 1977; Van Dyke and Soule 
2002). A third is the relative deprivation thesis, which emphasizes that there is often a perceived 
discrepancy between what people come to expect as normal and what they actually have or are 
able to attain (Gurr 1970; Seeman 1981). Finally, more recently scholars have proposed the 
―quotidian disruption‖ thesis, which points to suddenly imposed grievances and/or the disruption 
of everyday routines as the root cause of mobilization (Useem 1998; Walsh 1981).  
As might be expected, strain theory (and all of its variants) has been subject to a great 
deal of criticism over the years (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975). However, as Snow and his colleagues note (2005), critics of strain 
theory are not always clear about which variant they are criticizing. Thus, while we recognize 
that strain theory has, over the past several decades, become a less popular theoretical 
explanation of mobilization, we nonetheless feel it is important to account for strain in our 
models. In particular, because we are interested in overall levels of liberal protest in the United 
States, we focus on the absolute deprivation variant of strain theory described above.  
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 The resource mobilization perspective argues that the emergence of, and fluctuation in, 
protest is highly contingent on the availability of resources that can be used by activists and 
leaders to increase participation in protest and other types of social movement activity 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; 
Soule and King 2008; Snow and Soule 2010). Over the years, scholarship has delineated 
different types of resources (e.g., Snow and Cress 2000; Edwards and McCarthy 2004), typically 
differentiating between material (or monetary) resources, human resources (or skills), legitimacy 
(or moral resources) and organizational resources, such as social networks (Snow and Soule 
2010). In general, there is widespread empirical support for the basic argument that the 
availability, aggregation, and deployment of resources are the most important determinants of 
movement emergence and activity (see review in Edwards and McCarthy 2004).  
DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND HYPOTHESES 
Data Source: The Dynamics of Collective Action, 1960-1995 
Our analysis of liberal protest events has at its foundation a dataset of protest events, defined as 
any type of activity that involves more than one person and is carried out with the explicit 
purpose of articulating a grievance against (or expressing support for) a target. Data on these 
events were drawn from daily editions of the New York Times (NYT) between 1960 and 1995 and 
come from the Dynamics of Collective Action Project, run by Sarah Soule, Susan Olzak, John 
McCarthy, and Doug McAdam.
4
  For more in-depth discussions of the data used here, see 
McAdam and Su (2002), Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003), Van Dyke, Soule and Taylor (2004), 
Soule and Earl (2005), Earl and Soule (2006), King and Soule (2007), King, Bentele and Soule 
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 http://www.dynamicsofcollectiveaction.com. 
 
11 
 
(2007), Soule and King (2008), Soule (2009), Larson and Soule (2009), Olzak and Soule (2009), 
and Soule and Davenport (2009). 
For a particular protest event to be included in the dataset, it must have met three basic 
criteria. First, there must have been more than one participant at the event, since the interest is in 
collective action. Acts of protest carried out by individuals, such as uncoordinated hunger strikes 
or acts of self-immolation, are therefore not included. Second, participants at an event must have 
articulated some claim, whether this be a grievance against some target or an expression of 
support for some target. The events in the dataset are associated with any claim or issue area 
articulated by participants (in other words, these are not specific to a particular movement or set 
of movements).
5
  While claims can often be grouped into distinct ―social movements‖ or ―issue 
areas,‖ the coding team did not attempt to do this a priori. Because the coding rules required that 
protesters articulated some claim, collective events such as block parties, annual parades, and 
fund-raising campaigns were not coded.
6
  Also, the event must have happened in the public 
sphere or have been open to the public for the coding team to include it in their dataset. Thus, 
private or closed meetings by social movement actors are not included, but events within 
organizations (e.g., schools, churches, private organizations) are included if they were open to 
the public.
7
  Finally, coded events occurred all over the U.S.; that is, the researchers did not code 
events only in cities or only in certain areas.  
                                                 
5
 The project coded events associated with both sides of each claim or issue area. For example, 
the researchers coded both pro-war and anti-war/peace events. In all, they coded over 160 
different claims articulated over this period. 
 
6
 Note that if a block party turned into a demonstration in which participants articulated some 
claim, this would have been coded.  
 
7
 The data cannot speak to changes in protest that takes place outside of the public sphere, such 
as changes in movements that develop within corporations. As well, the dataset does not include 
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These data were collected in two distinct stages. First, researchers read each and every 
page of all daily issues of the NYT searching for any mention of protest events. By avoiding the 
use of an index to the NYT, they were able to find events that were embedded in articles on other 
(often related) topics. For example, protest events by poor people were found embedded in more 
general articles on the cost of living. It is likely that such events would not be indexed under 
headings such as, ―protest‖ or ―demonstration.‖  As a result, the project’s strategy nets a greater 
number of events than other strategies. The second stage of data collection involved the content 
coding of each event, noting that a single article can discuss multiple events, each of which was 
coded separately. Project personnel coded information on a variety of different topics, including 
the claim or issue area articulated at the event, event size and location, the participating group(s), 
targets of the event, organizational presence, tactical forms employed, and police presence and 
action taken by these actors at the event. Intercoder reliability estimates for most items on the 
codesheet were consistently at or above 90% agreement. In all, there are over 23,000 distinct 
protest events reported to have occurred in the U.S. between 1960 and 1995.
8
 
Our analysis in this paper required some recoding of events. First, since we are interested 
in liberal protest events, it was necessary to determine if each event was associated with a liberal 
cause. To do this, we had 7 different coders assess each of the claims associated with these 
events and determine if the claim is associated with a liberal or left-leaning cause. For example, 
we asked coders to determine if a pro-peace event would be, in general, associated with a liberal 
                                                                                                                                                             
organized labor events (e.g., work stoppages and strikes) because the dynamics of labor events 
are likely different from the rest of the protest sector. Note that if an organized labor event 
morphed into a public protest event, it would be coded as a distinct event, however. 
 
8
 Note that in some of the statistical analysis presented in herein, there are somewhat fewer cases 
due to missing data on one or more variable.  Also note that the full database from which these 
events were drawn covers well over 22,000 events but this is because it includes events using 
tactical forms that we exclude herein (see earlier footnote). 
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cause or a conservative cause. Or, we asked them to determine if an anti-abortion event was, in 
general, associated with a liberal or a conservative cause. Once each coder completed this task, 
we reconciled their decisions. If there was over 85% agreement (that is, if there was perfect 
agreement or if only 1 coder disagreed with the other 6), then we went with the code. In cases 
where there was less than 85% agreement, the authors of the paper discussed the claim and either 
made a decision or, in some cases, decided that we could not determine if a claim was, on 
balance, liberal or conservative. For example, there were a number of events that were in favor 
of retrieving prisoners of war or searching for military personnel missing in action. Or, there 
were victims’ rights events, for example. In such ambiguous cases, we simply assigned an 
ambiguous code and have excluded them from the analysis.  
Second, since we are interested in looking at yearly levels of liberal protest, we aggregate 
the events in the dataset to the yearly level. Below, we describe in more detail our dependent 
variable and how we constructed it.  
Newspaper Data 
Newspapers are one of the most widely used sources of data in the study of collective 
protest, in large part because they allow for the collection of large numbers of events, 
emphasizing the dynamic activities of social movements over the more static. McAdam and Su 
(2002: 704) note that the analysis of protest event data culled from newspapers is a 
―methodological staple‖ in social movement studies and that many of the ―classical empirical 
works in the field‖ use newspaper data.  
Because so many scholars use newspaper data, there have been many attempts to assess 
the potential biases associated with this source. There are two chief types of possible bias 
identified in several recent reviews on the subject (Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 
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2000; Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz 2005; Davenport 2010): description bias 
and selection bias. Description bias refers to how well (or poorly) the newspaper reporter 
describes what actually happened at a given event. Most attempts to assess this source of bias 
conclude that the ―hard facts‖ of the event are generally accurately covered by newspapers. 
Because we draw on ―hard facts‖ of the events (as will be described in detail below, we use data 
on tactics used, goals, articulated, organizations present, and policing), and not on ―soft facts‖ 
(such as opinions on the issue), we are confident that the accuracy of our data is acceptable for 
our purposes herein. 
Selection bias refers to the fact that not all protest events will be covered by a given 
newspaper and the possibility that what is covered is likely not a random sample of all events 
that took place. The literature on selection bias points out that more intense events (e.g., larger, 
more violent, injurious), those with conflict, those with ―significant actors‖ (e.g., celebrities, 
those defined as powerful and/or culturally legitimate), and proximity of the event to the 
newspaper are more likely to be selected for coverage (Ortiz et al. 2005; Davenport 2010). To 
deal with selection bias, unlike many prior studies using newspapers as a source of data on 
collective action events, the project team did not use an index of the NYT to identify events nor 
did they sample days of the newspaper. Instead, researchers reviewed daily editions of the 
newspaper and identified all collective action events that were reported, after which research 
assistants content-coded each event. While admittedly taking longer, this strategy helped to 
reduce the selection bias that may be introduced by indexing methodology and day-of-the-week 
rhythms in coverage (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). Moreover, the adopted approach 
allowed researchers to find a great many less intense and smaller events that were embedded in 
articles on larger, more intense events. For example, it was not uncommon to find mention of a 
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small, related event in a locale far from the New York described in an article on an event that 
took place in or around New York.  
Dependent Variables 
Based on our earlier theoretical discussion, it should be clear that the primary variables of 
interest in our analysis are public mood liberalism and liberal protest. Both of these variables will 
be treated, at times, as dependent variables. Our measure of liberal protest is rooted in the protest 
event data described above. Given our interest in the over-time movement of liberal protest and 
how protest responds to and influences public opinion, we must shift our focus from analyzing 
individual protest events to analyzing protest cross-temporally. To do this, we aggregate the 
protest event data by year in order to create an annual measure of protest events. In this paper we 
are focused on liberal protest events, so the annual count includes only protest events that were 
coded liberal, using the coding rules described above. We also take an additional step and weight 
the protests by participation. For each protest event, information regarding the number of people 
participating was recorded. Our weighting scheme simply multiplies each event by the number 
(in thousands) participating in the event before aggregating the events into an annual measure of 
liberal protest participation. In each year, then, our liberal protest participation variable provides 
the number of people, in thousands, participating in liberal protest events.
9
  This variable is 
particularly useful for our purposes because it tracks not only the existence of protest, but also 
                                                 
9
 Scholars have studied political protest for years. Two conceptualizations of mass protest arise. 
The first focuses on the number of people who actually participate. The second focuses on the 
number of events held. Given that we are interested in the impact of protest on public mood (and 
vice versa), we favor the former conceptualization of mass protest because we expect the 
numbers of people involved will have a greater impact on public mood. While the number of 
protest events should also share a relationship with public mood, mood and policy both result 
from the behavior of the mass polity, and our conceptualization of protest should also reflect the 
actions of the masses. We see an event-related definition of protest to be more related to elite 
considerations, and less to the passions and interests of the mass public. 
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the degree of participation in these protests. Clearly, a protest involving ten participants sends a 
much weaker signal to elected officials and the mass public than a protest involving tens of 
thousands. Our annual measure of liberal protest participation is available from 1960-1995. We 
display the resulting time series in Figure 1. 
 
Our second primary variable of interest is public mood liberalism. This measure, 
originally created by Stimson (1991), aggregates thousands of surveys and survey responses to 
tap the general ideological preferences of the mass public. Stimson discovered that the opinions 
of the mass public in a variety of policy domains generally move together over time. When 
sentiment in one domain moves in a conservative direction, sentiment in other domains move in 
a conservative direction as well. Public mood summarizes the ideological preferences of the 
American public in a single measure. And, while Stimson explores the possibility of multiple 
dimensions of public opinion, he finds that the primary dimension corresponds to the right-left 
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ideological continuum. The annual version of the 1
st
 dimension mood measure we utilize here 
has been updated through 2009 (the most recent update of the measure is available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson), though we only analyze the period 1960-1995, with higher 
values corresponding to more liberal public opinion. 
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses 
We discussed above our core hypotheses related to the potential linkages between public 
mood liberalism and liberal protest participation. We test each of these core hypotheses using 
time series data from 1960-1995. 
In addition to public mood liberalism, we examine several variables related to political 
opportunity structure and the macro politics model. Specifically, we include measures of 
presidential partisanship, the partisan composition of the House and the Senate, divided 
government, policy liberalism, and repression. The presidential partisanship variable is simply a 
dummy variable coded 1 for Democratic presidents and 0 for Republicans. The partisan 
composition measures report the number of Democrats in the House and Senate, respectively. 
Policy liberalism is a measure of the ideological content of policy output which is based on 
coding each of Mayhew’s (2005) important laws for ideological direction (liberal +1, 
conservative -1, neutral 0), summarizing the ideological content by year, and then cumulating the 
annual measure over time to generate an indicator of cumulative policy liberalism (see Kelly 
(2009) for a more detailed discussion of the policy liberalism measure).  
Traditional POS theory leads to the hypothesis that Democratic strength in government 
and liberal policy production increases liberal protest activity. However, a somewhat more 
pluralistic perspective would suggest that liberal protest is more likely to occur when the 
opposition is in power and objectionable policies are being enacted. Under this scenario, liberals 
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will feel more alienated and seek redress through protest activity when Republicans are more 
prevalent in national policymaking institutions and more conservative policies are created. For 
these partisan and ideological variables, just as we do for public mood, we have competing 
hypotheses rooted in divergent theoretical perspectives. Divided government is an indicator 
variable coded 1 if the House majority, Senate majority, and president are not of the same party 
and 0 if they are of the same party. POS theory leads to the hypothesis that divided government 
leads to a more open political system, which should lead to increased liberal protest to take 
advantage of the greater opportunity. Finally, the repression measure is based on the percentage 
of liberal and conservative protest events at which police were present. To calculate repression, 
we subtract the percentage of conservative protest events at which police were present from the 
percentage of liberal protest events at which police were present to generate a measure of net 
liberal protest repression. POS theory leads to the hypothesis that repression of liberal events will 
reduce liberal protest participation. 
We also test hypotheses regarding a variety of other variables related to different strands 
of the social movement literature. We use five different variables to tap aspects of strain theory – 
the percent of families living in poverty as reported by the Census Bureau, the percent 
unemployment reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the number of nonfarm employees in 
manufacturing (in thousands), the number of illegal immigrants, and the number of battle deaths 
incurred by U.S. forces. Strain theory suggests that higher rates of poverty, unemployment, 
immigration, and battle deaths should produce higher levels of liberal protest. The size of the 
manufacturing sector, however, should be inversely related to liberal protest participation based 
on the insights of strain theory. We examine three variables related to the resource mobilization 
thesis. Higher GDP is expected to produce greater liberal protest participation. The business 
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failure rate is hypothesized to decrease liberal social movement participation, while real median 
income should increase liberal social movement participation. Finally, we include the size of the 
U.S. population as a general control since the number of people participating in protests is likely 
to rise over time simply because the overall population exhibits steady growth. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We begin our analysis by estimating four simple models with liberal protest participation as the 
dependent variable. Since we are analyzing annual data from 1960-1995, we must be attentive to 
the various problems that can arise when utilizing time series data. In the four models shown in 
Table 1, most of the problems that often accompany time-series models are simply not present. 
First and foremost, our dependent variable is stationary. This means that we can estimate a 
model using the unaltered score on the dependent variable without concern about a spurious 
regression of one unit-root variable on another. Tests for autocorrelation in each model also 
show this not to be an issue. So, we go forward with OLS estimation of four static time-series 
models. We call these static models because they do not allow for the possibility that the causal 
process modeled is one that is distributed over time. This means that the effect of each 
explanatory variable is restricted to a single period. Essentially, we are assuming in these models 
that the current value of liberal protest participation is affected by the value of an explanatory 
variable at a single past or present point in time. Later in the analysis we add some additional 
complexities, but these simple models are useful as a starting point. 
The first three models separately examine variables associated with three theoretical 
approaches to explaining social movement activity. Strain theory is the focus of Model 1, Model 
2 examines the effect of three variables associated with the resource mobilization thesis, and 
Model 3 focuses on POS variables. The U.S. population is included in all of the models. These 
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three models show some degree of support for each of the main theoretical perspectives on social 
movement activity. Increasing levels of poverty are associated with higher levels of liberal 
protest activity. This is consistent with the idea that social and economic distress serve as 
mobilizing factors for social movement activity. Consistent with resource mobilization theory, 
the business failure rate is negatively correlated with liberal protest participation. When 
businesses are failing more often and therefore fewer mobilizing resources are available, less 
social movement activity occurs. We also see, however, that rising real median income, an  
indicator of greater resources for mobilization, is associated with lower levels of protest activity. 
This is inconsistent with the resource mobilization hypothesis, but can likely be discounted due 
to the fact that median income could also be viewed as an indicator connected with societal 
strain. It is quite difficult to identify measures over such an extended period of time that   
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Table. 1. Multivariate Analysis of Liberal Social Movement Protest Participation 
  
 Liberal Social Movement Participationt 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
Strain Theory     
Povertyt-1 145.8** 
(68.7) 
  -73.3 
(102.1) 
Unemploymentt-1 55.2 
(85.2) 
   
Manufacturing t-1 0.29 
(0.19) 
   
Immigrationt-1 -0.00 
(0.00) 
   
Battle Deathst 0.03 
(0.04) 
   
     
Resource Mobilization     
GDPt-1  -0.55 
(0.46) 
  
Business Failure Ratet-1  -10.9** 
(5.13) 
 -8.58* 
(4.96) 
Real Median Incomet-1  -0.13*** 
(0.04) 
 -0.20** 
(0.10) 
     
Political Opportunity 
Structure 
    
Democratic Presidentt   506.1 
(361.1) 
 
Senate Democratst   81.8 
(56.5) 
 
House Democratst   -19.6*** 
(6.43) 
-15.3*** 
(4.27) 
Divided Governmentt   638.7 
(438.8) 
 
Public Mood Liberalismt   -70.6** 
(28.0) 
-41.9* 
(24.3) 
Policy Liberalismt   -10.9 
(9.8) 
 
Repressiont   1019.3 
(766.6) 
 
     
U.S. Population (millions)t 15.5* 
(8.44) 
87.24** 
(39.5) 
9.21 
(6.68) 
49.9** 
(19.6) 
Constant -10288** 
(4509) 
-8913 
(5460) 
2461 
(3696) 
7245 
(3253) 
Adj. R
2 
0.08 0.19 0.32 0.43 
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explicitly examine resource mobilization independent of economic strain. In model 3, 2 POS 
variables attain statistical significance – the number of House Democrats and public mood 
liberalism both produce a decline in liberal social movement activity. 
In the final column of the table we estimate a more fully specified model of liberal protest 
activity that includes measures from each of the main theories of social movement activity, 
including the statistically significant variables from each of the first three separately estimated 
models. Once median income is included in this final model, the poverty rate is no longer 
statistically significant, nor is the estimate in the hypothesized direction. The business failure 
rate, lagged one year, continues to have a negative impact on liberal protest activity. Higher 
median income also drives down liberal protest activity. The business failure rate result has two 
possible interpretations. The first is that businesses provide general resources that encourage 
social movement activity (even liberal activity), and when businesses are floundering, such 
resources dry up. The alternative interpretation is that liberal social movements are often anti-
business and are not as motivated to protest when businesses are not succeeding. The result for 
median income is more straightforward, though more consistent with strain theory than resource 
mobilization. When times are good, there is less motivation to protest, and when times are bad, 
people are frustrated and are more eager to participate in protest activity in order to let their 
frustration be heard. 
The results for the POS variables are quite interesting. Recall that we suggested two 
alternative hypotheses related to POS. The first was rooted in the traditional POS model which 
argues that liberal protests will increase when the political environment is more open to the 
LM Test 0.68 0.94 0.98 0.23 
T 35 35 35 35 
Note: Table reports OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
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preferences of the left. The second is rooted in what we call a counter-cyclical protest model, in 
which liberals are less likely to protest when policymakers aligned with their preferences are in 
office and the public has a more positive attitude toward liberal policies. Our results strongly 
suggest the latter. When either the number of Democrats in the House or public mood liberalism 
is high, liberal protest participation tends to be lower as well. 
388.832
538.254
2402.800
509.652
0.000 500.000 1000.000 1500.000 2000.000 2500.000 3000.000
Public Mood Liberalism
House Democrats
Real Median Income
Business Failure Rate
 
Figure 2. Reduction in Liberal Protest Participation of Shift from 1 S.D. Below to 1 S.D. 
Above Mean 
 
In Figure 2 we attempt to provide a sense of the substantive and comparative impact of 
the statistically significant variables from Model 4 by charting the predicted change in liberal 
protest participation when each variable moves from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above its mean, holding the other variables constant. This figure shows that 
the substantive impact of each of the variables is substantial. Given that the dependent variable 
here is scaled such that a single point corresponds to one thousand individuals participating in a 
liberal protest, we can see that the variable with even the smallest impact, public mood 
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liberalism, decreases the number of people participating in liberal protests by more than 388 
thousand when mood moves from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above 
its mean. A similar change in real median income reduces participation in liberal protests by 
more than 2.4 million. In terms of the relative impact of each variable, median income, which is 
probably best interpreted as connected with strain theory, has the largest effect. This is followed 
by the number of House Democrats, a POS variable, the business failure rate which is connected 
to resource mobilization, and a second POS variable, public mood. 
To this point, the analysis has set aside the important question of causal direction. Earlier 
in the paper we laid out the argument that POS variables could influence social movement 
participation but that social movements could also generate either backlash against or sympathy 
for their goals in the macro political system. In this portion of the analysis, we focus explicitly on 
whether the two POS variables that we found to be significant predictors of social movement 
participation are indeed causes of protest activity or are actually caused by protest activity. We 
accomplish this by estimated a reduced form vector-autoregression followed by a Granger 
causality test. We essentially face a chicken and egg problem here, with the question being 
whether political factors move protest, or whether protest moves political factors. The Granger 
causality test starts with the intuition that most time series are in some part predicted by their 
own past values. In this case the intuition is that protest activity in one year may have something 
to do with protest activity in previous years. If lagged levels of predictor variables (here public 
mood liberalism and Democratic House seats) predict protest activity even while controlling for 
lagged values of protest activity, Granger causality is said to exist. 
The results of this analysis are in Table 2. Here we conduct three separate Granger tests 
by regressing the variable in the column on three lags of itself and three lags of the other two  
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Table 2. Granger Causality Test of POS Factors and Liberal Social Movement 
Participation 
    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable 
Liberal Social 
Movement 
Participation 
House 
Democrats 
Public Mood 
Liberalism 
Liberal Social Movement Participation - 0.02** 0.04** 
House Democrats 0.03** - 0.18 
Public Mood Liberalism 0.74 0.25 - 
Note: Cells report the significance level of the chi
2
 value produced from a Granger causality test 
based on a reduced-form vector autoregression including the three variables listed in the table. 
The null hypothesis is that the variable listed in the row does not Granger-cause the variable 
listed in the column. 
 
variables listed in the rows of the table. The table reports the joint significance of the three lags 
of the variable in the row, with a significant test result indicating the presence of Granger 
causation. The analysis shows that the number of House Democrats causes liberal protest 
participation, but at the same time the number of House Democrats is caused by liberal protest 
participation. With regard to public mood liberalism, we see that the results discussed above are 
somewhat misleading. In fact, public mood liberalism is caused by liberal protest activity but 
does not cause protest activity. Essentially, there is clear evidence here that liberal protest 
activity is exogenous to public mood liberalism. The Granger causality test says nothing about 
the direction of the impact of the variables analyzed. We saw in the earlier analysis that 
Democratic House seats produce less liberal social movement activity, but we have no evidence 
yet about the impact of protest activity on the political variables. 
In Table 3 we present three models that accomplish two goals. First, each of these models 
is dynamic. That is, these models provide for the possibility that the effect of explanatory 
variables is distributed over time. Unlike the earlier models of protest activity, we do not assume 
here that the impact of the independent variables is restricted to a single point in time. Second, 
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the final two models provide an estimate of the feedback effects of protest activity on the 
political system. 
Model 1 estimates an error correction model of the impact of Democratic House seats on 
liberal protest activity.
10
 Note that there are two coefficient estimates for Democratic House 
seats. One is the coefficient for the change in Democratic House seats from one year to the next. 
The second is the lagged value of Democratic House seats. Each of these coefficients provides 
different information about the impact of Democratic House seats. The coefficient for the first-
difference provides an estimate of the short-term, immediate impact of a change in House 
composition. The coefficient indicates that when the Democrats gain an additional seat in the 
House, liberal social movement participation decreases immediately by nearly 15 thousand 
individuals. This is an amazingly strong impact. The coefficient for the lagged level of 
Democratic House seats can only be interpreted in concert with the error correction rate which is 
the estimate for the lagged level of the dependent variable. In this model, the error correction rate 
is 0.67, meaning that 67 percent of the total long-run impact of Demcoratic House seats occurs in 
each year, beginning the year after the initial change in House composition. The total long-run 
impact is calculated by dividing -11.78 by the error correction rate, 0.67, to produce an effect of -
17.58. Given that the immediate impact of a one-seat increase of Democrats in the House is 
reduction of 14.83 in liberal protest participation, it is clear that most of the impact of changes in 
House composition occur quickly (14.83/17.58 = 0.84). This model does show, however, that the 
impact of House composition is somewhat distributed over time, such that an increase in 
                                                 
10
 Error correction models are often used when dealing with a nonstationary dependent variable 
when cointegration is present. However, cointegration is not a necessary condition required for 
the appropriate estimation of an error correction model. In fact, De Boef and Keele (2008) 
demonstrate that ECMs are quite flexible time series models that can be estimated appropriately 
in a wide variety of contexts.  
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Democratic seat share produces changes in liberal protest movement not only immediately, but 
also for several years into the future. The total long-run impact of just a single additional 
Democratic seat in the House is a reduction in protest participation of over 17.5 thousand people. 
Table 3. Dynamic Models of Liberal Social Movement Participation, House Partisanship, 
and Public Mood Liberalism 
    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable 
∆ Liberal 
Social 
Movement 
Participationt 
∆ House 
Democratst 
Public Mood 
Liberalismt 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.67*** 
(0.19) 
-0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.93*** 
(0.07) 
    
∆ Liberal Social Movement Participationt - -0.01** 
(0.00) 
- 
Liberal Social Movement Participationt-1 - -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Liberal Social Movement Participationt-2   0.002** 
(0.001) 
∆ % House Democratt -14.83** 
(5.95) 
- - 
% House Democratt-1 -11.78* 
(5.98) 
- - 
∆ Public Mood Liberalismt - - - 
Public Mood Liberalismt-1 - - - 
    
Adj. R
2 
0.38  0.33 0.86 
T 35 35 34 
Note: Table reports OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The first two models 
represent error correction models and the third column is a lagged dependent variable model. 
Significance levels: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Column 2 changes the dependent variable to House composition and the independent 
variable to liberal protest participation, again estimating an error correction model. In this model 
the full effect of protest movement happens in the short-term. When liberal protest activity 
increases, Democratic strength in the House declines. This effect is consistent with the backlash 
hypothesis which suggests that ideologically directed protest activity undermines the ability of 
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the social movement to see their goals reached through the mechanisms of government. But how 
strong is this effect? The coefficient estimate is just -0.01, but the standard deviation of liberal 
protest activity is more than 555. This means that a standard deviation change in liberal protest 
activity produces a 12 seat reduction in the size of the Democratic House caucus. This indicates 
that the impact is substantively significant and does operate to undermine the ability of liberal 
protest groups to successfully enact their preferred policies. 
Finally, in Column 3 we estimate a model of public mood liberalism, including two lags 
of liberal protest participation as well as a lagged dependent variable. This model specification is 
not unlike an error correction model, but we found when estimating an initial ECM that such a 
model assumed too complicated a dynamic structure. The LDV model is essentially a reduced 
form of an ECM that assumes a simpler dynamic structure. Here we see that liberal social 
movement participation increases the liberalism of public mood, with a two year lag. Since 
previous studies have documented a linkage between changes in public opinion and changes in 
policymaking (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002), the fact that liberal protests eventually 
lead to more liberal public opinion suggests that liberal protests have some potential to affect the 
political system in the intended manner. Here, as well, the substantive impact is impressive. The 
total long-run impact
11
 of a unit-change in liberal protest activity is 0.03. Recalling that the 
standard deviation of liberal protest participation is about 555, a standard deviation change in 
protest produces more than a 16 point increase in liberal public mood. This is a large effect given 
that the standard deviation of public mood during the period under analysis is about 4.6. A one 
standard deviation increase in liberal protests produces approximately a 3.5 standard deviation 
                                                 
11
 In an LDV model, the total long-run impact of an explanatory variable must account for the 
fact that a change in the dependent variable continues to feed forward into future values of the 
dependent variable. In this case, the coefficient estimate of .002 must be divided by 1- 0.93, to 
calculate the total effect of .029. 
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increase in public mood liberalism.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 First, liberal social movements matter for public opinion. The effect is of a large 
magnitude. While past scholars traditionally find that social movements have little effect on 
public opinion, we find a strong effect. Our divergent findings may be for two reasons. First, we 
study protest events in their aggregated form, while others study one protest movement at a time. 
Scholars have established that the entire macro political system (including public opinion, as 
well as the outputs of the House of Representatives, Senate, President, and Supreme Court) move 
in left-right directions across time (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). We produce 
evidence here that protest events strongly move the public opinion component of the political 
system. However, when protest movements are parsed out and considered separately, the 
strength of the overall ideological signal may be considerably weakened.  
 The second reason for our divergent findings may have to do with our operationalization 
of protest movements. Social movement scholars traditionally measure protest movement 
strength by counting the number of events a movement holds. We take a different tact, 
measuring protest movement strength as the number of people who participate in protest events 
in a given year. While we expect that both should be related to the ideological turns of the macro 
system, we believe that greater numbers of participants send a stronger ideological signal than 
greater numbers of events do because of the greater multiplier effect that protest events can have 
when more people attend. In the future, we will examine the empirical implications of the two 
measurement strategies. 
 How do social movements matter for public opinion?  As liberal social movements rise, 
public mood becomes more liberal (but also leading Democrats to hold fewer seats in the House 
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of Representatives). We find that liberal protest events are exogenous to public opinion, although 
the economy does affect the size of liberal protest event movements. If protest movements are 
exogenous from public opinion, then that leaves a lot of room for SMOs to have influence. The 
economy-only model fit with our liberal protest event measure is not very strong, which suggests 
that the movement of the series is not highly determined by the economy. This leaves a lot of 
room for political actors to make their mark by organizing the grass roots. 
 In this paper we focus on the liberal protest events (or participation therein), but we don’t 
report any results for conservative protest events. Originally we conceptualized of our liberal 
protest measure as a measure of net liberal protest --- the degree to which more liberal protestors 
than conservative ones took to the streets. However, our models of conservative protest reported 
R-squared statistics of zero, indicating a complete lack of systematic movement across time. As 
such, creating a net liberal protest variable only introduced error, because the conservative 
protest model appears to be pure error. We will further explore these results, and their 
implications, in the future.  
We conclude with caveats to our results. The greatest caveat is one that comes at the 
beginning of any new research agenda – this is our first cut at this topic, and we have much to 
learn. We will further explore the relationship between liberal protests and mood. We will 
expand the models to include policy, parsing out the dynamic relationships between liberal 
protest, policy mood, and public policy. 
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